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Estate owners in Greens Farms in Westport, Connecticut, and on the North Shore of Long Island 
doggedly fought inclusive, state-sponsored public recreation in the 1910s and 1920s. Private 
land-use goals shaped localism and, in turn, exploited home rule governance to control public 
land use. This study of local politics in the New York metropolis contributes to the ongoing 
regionalization of urban history. These home rule fights against state parks reveal the extent to 
which elite local interests systematically exploited ineffective county government to block 
Progressive-era regionalism. For all the interest shared by urban historians on the topic of real 
estate, there is surprisingly little cross-jurisdictional analysis on the competing pressures of local 
and regional property interests on city planning decisions. The empowerment of private property 
interests in local government in Westport and on the North Shore illuminate the potential for 
seeing the emergence of greater New York in a new light. 
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In the summer of 1916, wealthy artist and designer Louis Comfort Tiffany found little rest at his 
Long Island retreat. He was angry. A new public bathhouse tarnished the panoramic view of Cold 
Spring Harbor from the hilltop patio of Laurelton Hall, his fantastic Moroccan palace set among 
sixty acres of luxurious gardens. Laurelton Hall was meant to be a place of privacy and artistic 
inspiration. The fifty-foot long bathhouses, built by the Town of Oyster Bay, were a dark, plebian 
smear at the base of Tiffany’s work of art. Since June, as many as hundred people had frequented 
the bathhouses daily. As a further provocation, the town beach separated Tiffany’s home from the 
water. Outraged that the town would build its only public beach at the foot of his property, Tiffany 
ordered employees to dynamite the underwater groin that supported the sandy stretch of land. In 
response, the town instigated legal proceedings against him. This was one of five times the township 
and wealthy landowner met in court between 1910 and 1922. Laurelton Hall epitomized the dreams 
of exclusivity of the North Shore millionaire colony of which it was a part. Tiffany would not 
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relinquish his vision of a private waterfront playground without a fight. His battle illuminates the 
strategies with which New York City barons safeguarded proprietary interests and endeavored to 
conserve the shore as a private playground (Figure 1).1 
 
 
Figure 1. Louis C. Tiffany’s Laurelton Hall, circa 1930. The fountain and patio overlook Cold Spring 
Harbor and the beach.  
Source: Aronow, David (20th CE). [Laurelton Hall, Oyster Bay, New York, home of Louis Comfort 
Tiffany; Exterior, Terrace, looking towards Oyster Bay, from a series of forty-two interior and exterior 
views of Laurelton Hall]. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, NY, U.S.A. 
© RMN-Grand Palais / Art Resource, NY. 
 
Tiffany’s efforts reveal the essential concerns of greater New York’s elite estate communities 
in the larger contest between private rights and public power during the Progressive Era. In this 
fight, estate interests manipulated traditions of property law and local government to challenge the 
extension of public space across the suburbanizing districts beyond the city. In 1902, Tiffany had 
purchased more than 550 acres stretching two-thirds of a mile along Cold Spring Harbor, a stretch 
of beach frequented by local clammers and picnickers. The area also boasted a fashionable summer 




Lawsuits began when Tiffany closed the territory to the public, successfully petitioning the state 
Land Office for a “beneficial enjoyment grant” that extended his property line across land under 
water 400 feet into the bay.3 His plan to build a private beach required this grant; the foreshore, 
the land exposed during low water and submerged at high tide, was considered state-owned public 
property unless granted to an individual. But the Town of Oyster Bay claimed ownership of this 
beach. The state Supreme Court originally supported Tiffany’s grant, but in 1913 it reversed its 
decision, recognized the town’s title, and ruled Tiffany’s claims to the shore void.4 Thanks to 
Tiffany’s land-making, Oyster Bay gained a new beach on which it installed the very bathhouse 
that angered Tiffany to the point of employing dynamite. Yet the beach remained. Tiffany returned 
to court and switched arguments to protest that the existence of his former beach was in fact a 
nuisance that compromised navigation.5 After five injunctions and appeals, the court ultimately 
sided with Tiffany and restrained Oyster Bay from erecting buildings on the shore. 
Tiffany remained unsatisfied by the conclusion of his twelve-year court battle with Oyster Bay. 
Since the town had reclaimed the foreshore, Tiffany set out to redefine the terms of local 
government land ownership. In 1926, under state Village Law, he fathered the uncontested 
incorporation of Laurel Hollow from a group of contiguous estates surrounding his Cold Spring 
Harbor property. The new municipality immediately restricted beach use to village residents, 
excluding the larger population of the Town of Oyster Bay, the easternmost of Nassau County’s 
three townships. Twenty-one years after he first purchased his Cold Spring Harbor property, 
Tiffany finally settled the question of public access to the adjacent beach. 
Tiffany’s beneficial enjoyment grant and subsequent village incorporation introduce early 
twentieth-century regional development battle in greater New York in which the rich transformed 
preferences for exclusivity into law. Few estate owners took to dynamiting public improvements, 
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but quarrels like Tiffany’s ran up and down both sides of Long Island Sound. Tiffany belonged, in 
the words of Lewis Mumford, to “a small leisured class” that sought to seclude itself from the 
recreational needs of “a whole leisured population” emerging in greater New York in the early 
1900s.6 Connecticut and New York responded to the growing demand for public recreation and 
created park commissions to build a regional network of beaches. But estate owners drew on 
traditions of New England home rule and weak county government to challenge the expansive 
visions of public rights forwarded by the Connecticut State Park Commission (est. 1914) and the 
Long Island State Park Commission (est. 1924). 
The preservation of elite leisure landscapes through local politics is an important yet unexplored 
chapter of New York metropolitan growth. For all the scholarship on Progressive park planning in 
greater New York, particularly due to popular interest in master builder Robert Moses, little 
attention has been paid to the role of private landowners in regional planning. Formidable home 
rule opponents, often dismissed as parochial, effectively implemented a vision of private leisure 
on the metropolitan periphery.7 Uncovering the park protests on the North Shore—and parallel 
protests across the Sound in Connecticut—makes visible the struggle to define the spatial, 
governmental, and cultural relationship between localism and regionalism and the nature of urban 
growth. Regionalism demands the treatment of city and hinterland jointly and in consideration of 
a shared public interest. Regional park planners did not think in terms of localized community 
identity or values but in terms of a rational and balanced park network to service a generalized 
public. Localism, well captured in Tiffany’s story, rejects this perspective in favor of a multiplicity 
of small, autonomous publics. Estate communities defined recreation as a private commodity 
rather than as a public right. The story of property owner mobilization against parks reveals the 
contest between private rights and public power at the center of regional development. 
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The wealthy residential communities of southwestern Long Island Sound provide an 
opportunity to study a variety of localism espoused by estate owners and the shared strategies with 
which they fought public recreation programs. The process by which estate enclaves identified 
state parks as a threat essentially reveals the personal and community values perceived as 
endangered. A comparison of two contemporary contests over beach control on Long Island and 
in Connecticut in the first three decades of the twentieth century makes visible the role of property 
rights and the relevance of government forms in regional development. The estate enclave of 
Greens Farms, Westport, in Fairfield County, Connecticut, and the estate region of Long Island’s 
North Shore, which included Tiffany’s Oyster Bay estate, successfully blocked state park planning. 
The commonalities between Greens Farms and the North Shore allow for a comparison of the way 
in which local communities privatized land traditionally open to public recreation and shaped 
regional land-use patterns. 
Greens Farms and North Shore estate districts emerged as homogeneous, tightly knit, highly 
restricted communities in the early twentieth century. New York City’s wealthiest families 
established country retreats in both locales to segregate themselves from the urban public sphere. 
Class privilege, manifest in landscape tastes and leisure preferences, framed these communities’ 
elite social identities.8 Estate owners shared a fundamental disregard for the general public and 
public infrastructure that catered to it. This shared animus, manifested as opposition to regional 
planning and state intervention in local land-use through parks, justifies their comparison. Greens 
Farms is located fifty miles from New York City in the commuter corridor of the New York, New 
Haven, and Hartford Railroad (NYNH&H). The North Shore is a territory of serrated hills and 
harbors stretching twenty miles east from Queens to western Suffolk County and south to the 
Hempstead Plains in central Long Island. Formerly rural fishing and farming centers, both 
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locations became Gilded Age estate districts for New York City manufacturers and magnates in 
emerging banking and investment industries.9 Yet the size differences of these enclaves shaped 
protest strategies. While Greens Farms, a coastal district of just four square miles, boasted a 
collection of powerful New York City businessmen, the North Shore was home to the largest 
geographic concentration of power in America. None other than the nation’s sixty richest men 
constructed estates there, including J.P. Morgan, William Randolph Hearst, Vincent Astor, Henry 
Clay Frick, Jay Gould, Henry Ford, Pierre DuPont, William Whitney, Charles Pratt, and William 
K. Vanderbilt.10 Furthermore, variations in local government resulted in different strategies to 
oppose regional planning. Whereas Greens Farms exploited the New England town tradition and 
the corresponding vacuum of regional county power to challenge state park planning, North Shore 
millionaires used village incorporation to aggregate their interests across a hundred square miles. 
Estate owners brought shared cultural priorities into the local political arena to block social 
change and develop park planning alternatives. Localism has roots in the long tradition of home 
rule based on participatory decision making in local democratic forms of governance. Such 
autonomy protects local prerogatives on the assumption that state government cannot know what 
is best for a locality. On Long Island and in Connecticut, albeit for different reasons, counties 
lacked the power to mediate between state and entrenched home rule politics. The localized politics 
of exclusion common to Greens Farms and the North Shore coalesced around the maintenance of 
elitism and exclusivity. Residents depended on geographic isolation to maintain fantasy landscapes 
dedicated to leisure and free from the industry and class conflict of nearby urban centers. This 
secluded lifestyle came into conflict with the regionalism forwarded by new planning professionals 




Residents of these estate enclaves shared a fierce determination to privatize the environment 
amenities of their communities. Louis Comfort Tiffany and his rich neighbors expanded to a 
regional scale the expectations for privacy and leisure exhibited at Greens Farms. From 1910 to 
1932, North Shore barons incorporated local municipal governments with the power to wield 
power over public land use and made the territory inaccessible to outsiders. Across the Sound, the 
privileged localism of Greens Farms landowners remained paramount until 1937 when 
Connecticut finally managed to complete its long-planned state beach at Sherwood Island in 
Westport. For the first two decades of Sherwood Island State Park’s existence, adversaries 
thwarted all efforts to develop state-owned beach as a public park. From 1914 to 1937, the island 
was the focus of hostilities between vested wealth and public rights in which property owners 
mobilized against Connecticut’s state park commission. 
Part I: Sherwood Island and the Connecticut Shore 
 
In 1914, Albert M. Turner identified 230-acre Sherwood Island as the best site for a state beach in 
Fairfield County, setting the stage for a showdown between the Connecticut State Park 
Commission (CSPC) and nearby estate owners who recoiled at the idea of thronging holiday 
crowds in their midst. Turner knew the Connecticut shore intimately. He knew the rocky beaches 
of the narrow southwestern Sound, the modest sand dunes of its Rhode Island border, and the 
omnipresent pungent mud of its salt marshes at low tide. For three months in 1914, he hiked the 
coast from New York to Rhode Island. Hired by newly minted CSPC, Turner surveyed 
Connecticut’s 245-mile coastline for a large, scenic beach well removed from the pollution pouring 
from the industrial ports of New Haven and Bridgeport. Turner’s report, one of the first state park 
surveys in America, became a foundational document of American state park ideology.12 Of the 
245 miles Turner walked, approximately 45 were inside city or borough limits, including a 
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frontage of 6.5 miles of city parks. Turner found 70 miles of the shore tightly packed with private 
beach cottages and an additional 40 of large, costly residences. Only 90 miles remained available 
for state beaches.13 
The park commission prioritized a state beach program because the majority of Connecticut’s 
population lived in the state’s somewhat narrow and rolling coastal plain.14 In 1914, the state’s 
average population density was 231 persons per square mile, but along the Sound this ratio reached 
529 persons per square mile. Fairfield County’s coastal commuter corridor along the NYNH&H 
already housed a quarter of the state’s 1,114,756 residents. The CSPC hoped to establish five 
evenly spaced 2.5-mile-long beaches. “From the date of the first meeting of the Commission it has 
been plainly evident that the field most urgently demanding attention,” the CSPC observed in 
1914, was the “shore of Long Island Sound. Its popularity for purposes of recreation is almost 
universal, there can never be any more of it, and the rapid development of the last two decades has 
left very little of it accessible to the public.”15 Turner identified 230-acre Sherwood Island in 
Westport, a former farmers’ collective and tide mill site, as the only potential state beach in 
developing southwestern Connecticut. 
Turner faced significant obstacles in his search for a state beach site in Fairfield County. First, 
state law privileged private use of the beach over common public use. Connecticut allowed owners 
of upland property to use the foreshore for docks and other purposes without specific grants.16 
Connecticut courts furthermore ignored recreation as part of the public’s right to use tidelands and 
limited these public rights to only unobstructed access for navigation.17 Second, property values 
were skyrocketing. As late as 1898, Connecticut’s beaches had often been included free in the sale 
of adjacent property or priced by acre. By the 1910s, beachfront was priced more expensively by 
foot; land that had sold for $400–$1,000 an acre now sold for $15–$40 a foot, or $3,000–$10,000 
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an acre.18 Increasing real estate values threatened the preservation of Connecticut’s shoreline. 
“Natural scenic beauty and the unrestricted private ownership of land are things apart, and quite 
incompatible,” Turner concluded. “The small landowner fairly clogs the landscape with his 
wooden dreams, and the big one walls it up.”19 The field secretary acknowledged that “to the 
fortunate few who may have a country house or a shore cottage with an automobile or so,” a public 
beach was unnecessary. Without state beaches, however, Turner worried the majority of the public 
would soon face only “the dusty highway and the No Trespass sign.”20 (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Connecticut’s privatized beaches.  
Note: “The shore of Long Island Sound,” Turner reported, had become “an almost endless row of 
individual vagaries, nondescript caricatures of habitations, alternating with miles of sea-walls, land-walls, 
and hedges” concealing expensive estates. This photograph, which the Field Secretary included in his first 
report to the CSPC, captures the privatization that so worried Turner. The sign reads “$10 REWARD for 
the correction of any person caught trespassing upon these primises [sic] day or night with or without dog 
or gun.” Turner captioned the image “One good reason for State Parks.” 
Source: Report of the State Park Commission to the General Assembly for the Fiscal Year Ended 




Turner advocated park design to serve the collective public and included recreation in his 
definition of the public good in 1914, nearly a decade before these ideas gained nationwide 
credence. At the end of World War I, fifty-five years after the establishment of the nation’s first 
state park at Yosemite, two-thirds of states lacked state parks. Not one had successfully developed 
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a comprehensive state park system.21 Turner’s philosophy that Connecticut had a responsibility to 
protect public beach use from privatization proved unpopular in exclusive Greens Farms. Estate 
owners there defined access to the shore as a specialized local prerogative and took a stand against 
accessibility for the larger public. In 1914, Turner reported that a substantial section of 
Connecticut’s tidelands had already passed into private hands and would “more jealously guarded 
each year as its value increases.”22 His fear proved a reality in Greens Farms, where park opponents 
successfully stalled state beach development for nearly a quarter century. 
Picturesque Greens Farms, located fifty miles from New York City in the developing corridor 
of the NYNH&H Railroad, flourished as an estate community for industrial, banking, and 
investment magnates during the Gilded Age. New York business tycoons such as Edward T. 
Bedford, an associate of John D. Rockefeller, transformed former colonial farms into palatial 
summer estates—Bedford became Westport’s largest taxpayer—and forwarded a powerful vision 
of privileged localism.23 The keystone parcel of the CSPC’s park plan was the high ground between 
the mill pond and the NYNH&H tracks. In 1921, however, George W. Gair, an executive of a 
Brooklyn-based paper goods firm, had purchased a 53-acre parcel that included this site.24 Gair 
acquired large sway in local politics because of the half-million dollars he paid in yearly taxes and 
his appointment as Chairman of Westport’s Board of Finance in the 1920s. Determined to preserve 
the seclusion of his new Greens Farms estate, he organized an anti-park constituency of powerful 
Republican estate owners including his neighbor Bedford.25 The Greens Farms community 
occupied a small geographic range of just four square miles. Park opponents lived in proximity to 
each other and Sherwood Island. They were also all taxpayers and voters in Westport. The public 
who lived outside of Greens Farms’ socioeconomic, spatial, and jurisdictional boundaries were 
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seen as invaders. Gair mobilized his community with “jaws set, teeth clenched, and one slogan, 
‘They Shall Not Pass.’”26 
Based on Turner’s suggestion, the CSPC first purchased acreage on Sherwood Island in 1914. 
By the close of 1917, however, the commission owned just 30 piecemeal acres. Only visitors 
willing to ford New Creek at low tide could enjoy state-owned Alvord Beach.27 The lack of 
signage, accessible roads, and clearly marked parking made locating public holdings akin, an early 
visitor complained to a local newspaper, to searching for “a light hid under a bushel.”28 Because 
of these limitations, the CSPC considered the park useless until further development. 
Greens Farms residents envisioned an exclusive patrician estate community incompatible with 
a plebian public park. The prestigious Sturges family complained that visitors built fires on their 
beach and lawn at the foot of Pine Creek.29 Gair found such behavior appalling and issued a call-
to-arms to preserve the sanctity of the domestic waterfront of Greens Farms. Locals bathed at the 
town-owned Burial Hill and Compo Beaches and had no need of a park at Sherwood Island. “Home 
sanity,” he claimed, was at risk because of out-of-towners, “with the usual ‘don’t-care-a-damn’ 
spirit for the locality,” who Gair predicted “would change Greens Farms, with all its unique charm 
and quiet home life, into a Coney Island and kill many places like mine.”30 It was inappropriate of 
the state, in the words of Gair’s constituent Harry R. Sherwood, to “come into Westport and ruin 
a good part of [Greens Farms] property.”31 To Greens Farms residents, localism meant exclusive 
neighborhood control of development and use of the shore. 
In rejecting the idea of a regional public, Greens Farms localism exacerbated the park crisis in 
Fairfield County that had inspired the CPSC’s plan for Sherwood Island. In the 1920s, Fairfield 
failed to meet the ideal of an acre of park for every hundred persons, a ratio identified by the 
planners of the Regional Plan for New York and Its Environs, and lagged behind its neighbors. 
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Southwestern Fairfield County provided one acre of parks for every 332 residents, while the Bronx 
provided one acre per every 209 persons and Westchester provided a stunning one acre for every 
28.32 In Fairfield County’s cities, the situation was even worse. Bridgeport, for example, possessed 
only one park acre for every 401 persons.33 As an idealized category, a region is defined by a 
shared geography and structural political and economic processes within which residents find 
commonalities in political, economic, and social trends. Greens Farms localism, however, reveals 
the extent to which residents drew internal boundaries that segmented the region.34 To Greens 
Farms residents, the regionalism that drove state planning was synonymous with public access and 
outsider control. Both were unwanted. Greens Farms fought these dual aspects of regionalism—
the influence of outsider state planners and broadly defined recreational public. For example, 
Frederick M. Salmon, an influential Westport representative in the state legislature, did not believe 
his hometown had any responsibility to provide parks for a regionally-scaled public. He dismissed 
park support exactly because it emanated from Norwalk and Bridgeport. “Let those cities clean 
their own polluted harbors,” Salmon said, “and they won’t have to depend on Westport for clean 
bathing waters.”35 The Greens Farms philosophy of isolation led residents to deny any 
responsibility to address the public recreation needs of nearby cities. 
Following Sherwood Island State Park’s inception in 1914, Westport’s Town Clerk predicted 
that nearby landowners “would try to put the State in an embarrassing position” by holding up the 
purchase or transferring or developing the property.36 He was right. Arthur Sherwood restricted 
his 39 acres in the center of the island for residential use through covenants, while other anti-park 
allies engaged in a flurry of real estate transactions to subdivide nearly 2,000 feet of shore, 
including the area informally used by recreationalists as parking.37 Between August and December 
1924, three real estate companies incorporated, bought Sherwood’s land, and platted the center of 
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the island for restricted residential use. These subdivisions, combined with the nearly fifty acres 
Bedford sold to the Gair family, secured almost 100 acres from state reach.38 (Figure 3). 
Sherwood Island residents doggedly policed property boundaries to prevent the few 
excursionists who found the public beach from spilling onto private property. They installed 
concrete walls and high wooden fences. Frustrated visitors found “most of the beach from high to 
low water mark fenced off in the interest of private owners, with a high barrier of railroad ties and 
guarded by a big yellow dog, unmuzzled.”39 One excursionist angrily concluded that the typical 
Sherwood Island resident “has the advantage, due to greater wealth, of being able to own land 
bordering the beach and thereby thinking he is owner of the beach and the water in front of his 
property.”40 Estate owners effectively, in the words of the Bridgeport Sunday Post, “claim[ed] the 
foreshores for their own.”41 
 
Figure 3. Sherwood Island Park Association properties map of Sherwood Island.  
Note: While this map was created in 1932, these private parcels came out of the 1920s scramble to block 
the state park.  




Greens Farms did not stop at intimidation and physical barriers to isolate state-owned Alvord 
Beach. The community’s elite localism functioned as a political strategy which Gair and his allies 
mobilized through local government. At an October 27, 1924, town meeting, Gair fathered and 
ushered through an aggressive anti-park resolution: “Resolved: That the town of Westport does 
not desire the state of Connecticut to acquire additional land at Sherwood Island for park purposes. 
Resolved further that the town of Westport does not desire a state park at Sherwood Island. 
Resolved, that the representatives from this town to the next General Assembly do their best to 
prevent an appropriation for any such purpose.”42 This resolution made Gair’s opinions municipal 
policy, as seen in the town’s 1929 dredging of New Creek. Gair and cottage tenants on the western 
tip of the island complained to the town executive board that the mud and stagnant water of New 
Creek at low tide bred swarms of insects. In the summer of 1929 Westport’s selectmen approved 
and contracted out the dredging of the creek on the grounds of mosquito control. New Creek 
became a twelve-foot channel extending 450 feet.43 Since fording the creek was the only way to 
reach Alvord Beach, the dredging effectively disrupted access to the state-owned waterfront. 
Outraged park supporters castigated Westport and “Gair’s ditch” as a blatant attempt to thwart 
public access to the beach.44 Demonstrators from inland Redding, Ridgefield, and New Canaan 
Hill forded the creek to protest the physical and social barriers preventing public use of the shore.45 
Nothing came of the protest. 
George W. Gair not only aligned local politics with his interests but extended his community’s 
privileged localism in the state legislature to wield private power over public property. Gair’s 
Greens Farms constituency enjoyed substantial influence in the state Republican Party. 
Comptroller Frederick M. Salmon, the chief fiscal administrator of state accounting from 1923 to 
1932, and fellow Republicans in control of the Appropriations Committee of the General 
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Assembly allied with park opponents.46 By the early twentieth century, the Republican Party, 
drawing votes from white, Protestant suburbanites and rural residents, controlled the state 
legislature.47 The state assembly honored Westport’s anti-park resolution and consistently denied 
the CPSC the funds necessary to finish purchasing land at Sherwood Island. In 1921 the General 
Assembly denied the park commission their entire $535,000 request; by 1924 the CPSC had held 
139 meetings and submitted plans to five successive sessions of the General Assembly without 
successfully securing additional financial support to finish Sherwood Island State Park.48 The 
substantial progress at Hammonasset State Beach in eastern New Haven County underscored the 
state’s persistent evasion of funding for Sherwood Island. By 1924, three years after 
Hammonasset's opening, the state had spent $130,960 for 565 acres and the construction of first-
aid and lifeguard stations and a 1,400-locker bathhouse there and only $12,959 for the acquisition 
of 48 noncontiguous acres at Sherwood Island.49 In contrast to Hammonasset, the CSPC deemed 
its Westport beach a failure.50 In April 1923, Park Commissioner George A. Parker had resigned 
to protest the legislature’s inaction. William H. Burr, one of the only Greens Farms residents who 
supported the park, commented on the obstructionism and subsequent resignation to Turner, 
“Sorry Mr. Parker resigned, but now we know what we are up against.”51 
Having successfully blocked the completion of Sherwood Island State Park for a decade and a 
half, in 1931 Republicans in Hartford went as far as attempting to totally depower the state park 
commission. In that year, the Republican-controlled General Assembly created a special 
subcommittee to relieve the park commission (renamed the State Park and Forest Commission 
[SPFC]) of its control of parks in Fairfield County.52 The subcommittee toured Sherwood Island 
under the care of Gair and Westport’s First Selectman King W. Mansfield, a proponent of beach 
relocation; the subcommittee subsequently recommended abandoning the territory in favor of a 
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new park at Roton Point, Norwalk.53 Protest erupted in Fairfield’s cities and from its planning 
organizations. The editor of the Bridgeport Post condemned the state for considering the $700,000 
Roton Point project and abandoning property that it had owned for seventeen years. The president 
of the Fairfield County Planning Association accused the subcommittee of neither visiting Roton 
Point nor appraising the land before issuing a “flabby” and “amorphous” report that served only 
Greens Farms’ anti-park agenda. Because of the uproar, the bill was recalled and effectively 
killed.54 Nevertheless, that the General Assembly created such a subcommittee underscores the 
power of Republican Greens Farms elites to block state-sponsored regionalism.55 
Throughout the 1920s, the state legislature acknowledged Westport’s obstructionism and its 
own “policy of inaction.”56 This inaction, secured by Republican interests, was exacerbated by the 
fact that Connecticut counties lacked the power to mediate between state and local politics. The 
state’s New England town tradition situated governmental authority in local jurisdictions. At its 
founding as a colony in 1636, Connecticut created town government. It did not create county 
jurisdiction until the 1660s. A secondary form of government, the county lacked a chief executive 
who could forward a regional development program.57 As a result, inland residents were left with 
no effective county authority to demand recourse; they could do little more than write angry letters 
to the editor condemning the state’s pandering to the “guard of New York commuters” to keep the 
“common herd from the back towns” off the beach.58 
For over two decades, the state failed to guarantee the rights of the public in the face of vested 
interests. New park planners in greater New York, led by Turner of the SPFC, forwarded the idea 
that Connecticut had a responsibility to provide beaches to the regional public and called for a 
regional perspective at the same time Gair and his constituents mobilized against Sherwood Island 
State Park. Gair’s cohort both protested this regionalism and articulated an alternative vision of a 
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privatized shore. Greens Farms estate owners romanticized the coast as a stretch of small villages 
and estates dispersed across open land. Their privileged strain of localism bolstered this fantasy 
by rejecting a regional conception that linked their enclave with industrializing centers like 
Bridgeport and the right of a broad public to recreate alongshore, even though the state held 
Sherwood Island in trust for the public. Planners predicted Fairfield would become a county of 
large cities woven together by intensive suburban development. “What Westchester County is 
today Fairfield County will be tomorrow,” the Fairfield County Planning Association urged. 
“What Bridgeport is today, the other cities of the County will be tomorrow.”59 Prosperous 
Bridgeport boasted the state’s largest park system; suburbanizing Westchester boasted the nation’s 
most celebrated comprehensive county park system. Each was an example of growth and 
successful park planning. While the SPFC successfully built parks across the state, through home 
rule Greens Farms rejected state parks as well as this vision of regional planning for the coastal 
corridor.60 
 
Part II: Long Island’s Gold Coast 
In the same years that Greens Farms estate owners challenged an inclusive vision of public 
recreation in Connecticut, on Long Island’s North Shore wealthy individuals sought seclusion and 
private leisure on an even greater scale. Louis C. Tiffany and Walter Jennings on Cold Spring 
Harbor both closed former popular resorts. At Glen Cove, Standard Oil co-founder Charles Pratt 
built a stunning 1,100-acre family compound and privatized three-quarters of a mile of waterfront 
and more than 40 adjacent acres of land under water.61 In addition, as Tiffany’s privatization 
strategies reveal, beneficial enjoyment grants became stepping stones to even greater privatization 
as estate owners looked to control not just riparian beaches but nearly forty miles of shoreline. 
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Greens Farms localism was rooted in spatial proximity and neighborhood homogeneity. North 
Shore resistance to state parks, however, occurred on a much larger geographic scale. Because of 
the palatial scale of individual estates and their aggregation across northern Long Island, the 
region’s elite anti-park coalition spanned a collection of homogenous municipalities. In addition, 
differences between state and county power structures in Connecticut and New York offered 
landowners different tools to exert control over local public recreation. North Shore barons 
cumulatively employed beneficial enjoyment grants and home rule governance to secure their 
private playground. 
The concentration of Gilded Age wealth on the North Shore gained the region the nickname the 
“Gold Coast” by the first years of the twentieth century. Nick Carraway’s cheeky summary, “I had 
a view of the water, a partial view of my neighbor’s lawn, and the consoling proximity of 
millionaires” in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby (1925) captured the region’s defining 
characteristics.62 The 110-square-mile Gold Coast was definable because of its hilly topography, 
its waterfront of deep fjord-like bays, and the homogeneity of its millionaire population. Home to 
the largest concentration of wealth and power in the United States, the district encompassed more 
than six hundred estates virtually undisturbed by industry, public parks, schools, or subdivisions.63 
Gold Coast barons built a landscape of private leisure and display composed of extravagant estate 
compounds including greenhouses, casinos, pools, and personal polo fields and golf courses. 
Utilities magnate John E. Aldred summarized, “That part of Long Island was inaccessible. We, 
Mr. Guthrie and I, the Pratts and the Morgans wanted to keep it so.”64 
The snobbery and obstructionism of Gold Coast millionaires who strove to preserve their 
privileged playground dominate the narrative of North Shore development. The popular attention 
to Robert Moses’s incendiary battle with millionaires over state parks and the Northern State 
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Parkway, as told in Robert Caro’s The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York 
(1972), directs the reader away from a more nuanced understanding of Moses’s conflict with New 
York City’s industrial aristocracy in Long Island development. By the end of his career in the early 
1970s, Moses faced popular and scholarly condemnation for his personal ambitions and the 
institutional failure of urban renewal. Until recent revisionist scholarship, this criticism overrode 
the fact that Moses had enjoyed widespread popularity as a Progressive-era park planner.65 Yet his 
popularity eclipsed shortcomings in park plan execution, specifically on the North Shore: neither 
wholesale criticism nor praise adequately addresses the Gold Coast battle between regionalism 
and localism of which Moses was a part. Reckoning with the obstacles mounted by private property 
interests refocuses the narrative of Long Island development on the power of elitist home rule to 
shape public land-use patterns. This point of view reveals the limits of regionalism—and Moses’s 
power—in the New York metropolis. 
Long before Robert Moses unveiled his 1924 plan to make Long Island a public playground for 
New York City urbanites, beneficial enjoyment grants like Louis Comfort Tiffany’s proliferated 
along the North Shore. These grants, which empowered riparian landowners to privatize and build 
on tidelands, were the first step landowners took to insulate beaches from public use. In 1850, the 
New York State Land Board, which managed state-owned public land, created beneficial 
enjoyment grants. Because of the Public Trust Doctrine, a legal trust established at the nation’s 
founding, the government is required to preserve public use of the shore.66 While under Public 
Trust Doctrine the state could legally divest and make private the shore, in theory the public’s 
rights remained paramount. Between 1880 and 1920, however, the Land Board managed state-
owned foreshore as property liable to divestment. On the North Shore, grants encompassed nearly 
the entire western shore of Hewlett’s Point north of Little Neck Bay; the majority of the eastern 
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shore of Hempstead Harbor; and nearly all of the western shores of Oyster Bay and Cold Spring 
Harbor.67 In total, the number of beneficial enjoyment grants challenged public access to North 
Shore beaches.68 Gold Coasters extended the privacy of the estate first across public beaches with 
beneficial enjoyment grants and then across contiguous estates through village incorporation. Such 
legal mechanisms fostered an extraordinary period of hinterland growth in which local proprietary 
interests effectively barred the public from the entire North Shore. 
In 1910, Louise and Roswell Eldridge pioneered estate incorporation in New York State in Great 
Neck, Long Island. Speculators developed subdivisions in the southern section of Great Neck 
peninsula near the Eldridge estate Udalls in the early 1900s. These new residents, largely of modest 
means, called for the incorporation of villages and special districts drawn to include estates, such 
as Udalls, whose high property taxes could be exploited to cover the majority of the costs of new 
municipal services.69 Faced with increased taxation, the Eldridges preemptively incorporated the 
territory around Udalls as the Village of Saddle Rock on October 26, 1910. The estate made up all 
but 10 percent of the new village’s territory. Village status sheltered their estate from inclusion in 
any special districts, removed it from the Town of North Hempstead’s tax roll, and gave the 
Eldridges legal oversight of village public works.70 Until 1910, state Village Law required a 
minimum population of two hundred persons over a square mile or less, constraining incorporation 
to territories with moderate or high population densities; on May 7, however, the legislature had 
amended the law to allow the incorporation of districts less than one square mile with fifty to two 
hundred persons.71 The amendment made possible the transformation of the 126-acre Udalls and 
its approximately fifty servants and family members into a municipal entity. Roswell Eldridge’s 
influence in state politics probably enabled the passage of this amendment. The incorporation of 
Saddle Rock empowered the Eldridges to dictate use of nearby public land.72 
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Beginning with the Eldridges in 1911, Gold Coast estate owners constructed village boundaries 
in service of particular ideological and material interests, namely, the community’s leisure and 
aesthetic preferences and privacy expectations. The intensive incorporation of estates or groups of 
estates as villages created a millionaires’ district across the North Shore between 1911 and 1932, 
the period during which it was possible to incorporate small areas with populations of more than 
fifty persons. Sociologist Dennis Sobin employs the term “estate village” to define incorporated 
villages primarily or exclusively composed of contiguous large estates that generally lacked 
traditional village centers. More than twenty-four estate villages were incorporated between 1911 
and 1932, including Lake Success, Laurel Hollow, Old Westbury, Saddle Rock, and Sands Point.73 
Incorporation did not service community-building. Estate villages emerged as exclusive spaces 
where like-minded industrialists did not so much interact but maintained parallel lives in gracious 
seclusion. As a form of government, the incorporated village epitomized the privileged, 
exclusionary localism of estate owners. Estate interests achieved political hegemony through the 
fragmentation and the spatial exclusion of potential resistance from middle-class property owners. 
Of the service communities that supplied estates with labor and provisions and the commuter 
railroad stops at Great Neck, Glen Head, Locust Valley, Oyster Bay, and East Norwich, all except 
Great Neck remain unincorporated.74 In the nineteenth century, incorporation was generally 
employed to supply suburbanizing districts with urban municipal infrastructure of streets and 
sewerage. In contrast, estate owners incorporated exclusive villages to suburbanization and the 
ensuing public works taxes and assessments.75 
Incorporation formalized societal fragmentation and abetted North Shore elitism. Not only did 
estate villages skirt developing suburban districts, they stretched to embrace contiguous estates to 
further solidify a homogenous population of Gold Coast barons. In 1926, Louis Comfort Tiffany 
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and his neighbor the prominent lawyer Henry W. DeForest sponsored the incorporation of Laurel 
Hollow. The two families comprised seven of the fifteen people who voted on the incorporation 
of the less-than-square-mile community. Laurel Hollow village government developed under 
Tiffany’s thumb. DeForest’s son-in-law became mayor; DeForest and Tiffany’s son-in-law 
received two of the three village trustee positions; and Tiffany’s architect became road 
commissioner.76 Working with like-minded neighboring estate owners, Tiffany finally achieved 
control over development. 
Land transfers between estate-holding families were a common practice on the Gold Coast. 
Property owners sliced parcels from their estates and sold them within their cohort to create the 
minimal population required by law for incorporation without having to include subdivisions. 
Leading up to the vote for the consolidation of the villages of Barkers Point and Motts Point into 
the village of Sands Point, a local reporter observed, “From the real estate transfers recorded in the 
County Clerk’s office . . . one would think a boom had struck the Point section. But it was only to 
create a few more freeholders . . . as will be readily understood by a careful reading” of the 
records.77 To enable consolidation, the Guggenheims, Kingsburys, and Laidlaws sold family 
members land. Of the twenty real estate transactions, all but four unfolded within families. All 
transactions carried only nominal prices. Howard Kingsbury was president of Barkers Point and 
James Laidlaw was the attorney who had overseen the village’s incorporation: both had explicit 
vested interests in a successful consolidation. Representatives of the excluded subdivisions 
speculated, with probable accuracy, that school tax avoidance drove the land transfers for 
incorporation. The three villages successfully consolidated in July 1912. 
Gold Coast incorporation took on a distinctive pattern. That at times incorporation appeared to 
be a charade of democratic voting underscored the power of estate owners in the creation of a 
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typical “millionaire municipality.” Estate owners spearheaded incorporation to serve personal 
goals and ran, usually uncontested, for positions on the new village boards. Charles E. Ransom, 
the town clerk of Oyster Bay who conducted ten incorporation elections in the twenties recalled, 
“[i]n most comparatively few home owners were eligible to vote. . . . On several occasions the 
entire vote was cast in the first hour . . . in almost every instance the election was held in luxurious 
surroundings and the hosts did everything possible to make the hours pass pleasantly.”78 Ransom 
generally oversaw the vote and Winslow S. Coates usually acted as the attorney for the petitioners. 
Contestation was rare. Local businessmen who depended on estate business tended to vote with 
estate owners, as did the large portions of the village population employed on estates. Estate 
owners were simultaneously voters’ employers, campaigning politicians, and election hosts, 
providing refreshments. Voting against such figures would have been at the least uncomfortable. 
In Saddle Rock, for example, Roswell Eldridge was mayor from incorporation in 1911 to his 1927 
death, when his wife Louise succeeded him—in an election held on Eldridge property. She 
subsequently held the office through the 1930s.79 In the words of a New York Times headline, 
estate village incorporation could be easily summarized: “Millionaire Village Born as Iced Drinks 
Clink; 13 Voters Create Muttontown, L.I., Unanimously.”80 
Exclusionary laws ensured privacy through spatial and social distance, the inherent purpose of 
estate village governance. Incorporation withdrew land from town oversight; this home rule made 
local prerogative over land use largely untouchable.81 Villages across greater New York passed 
ordinances to ban outsiders from local beaches. In Westchester County, New York, across the 
Sound, Rye’s efforts to restrict parking on local roads were overturned by the county’s progressive 
Board of Supervisors. In contrast, the Gold Coast villages of Lake Success, Kings Point, and Sands 
Point all passed ordinances restricting parking near parks and swimming spots to restrict users to 
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residents within walking distance. Following incorporation, Tiffany’s Laurel Hollow immediately 
restricted beach use to residents. Lake Success prohibited “meeting on sidewalks.”82 Estate owners 
additionally used municipal status to bar industrial and commercial land use through zoning.83 
Cove Neck banned the erection of “amusement concessions and ‘hot-dog’ stands” on the peninsula 
in its first official ordinance.84 When incorporation was proposed for Lake Success in 1927, one 
resident complained that the proposed village zoning was “so rigid . . . as to deprive the property 
owners therein all the free use of their property.” A majority of the area’s residents, however, 
welcomed restrictions that could bar city recreationalists, and approved incorporation.85 
Beneficial enjoyment grants and restrictive village ordinances eroded the publically owned 
shore unfettered by effective challenges until the 1920s. The New York Attorney-General’s 1911 
worry that the proliferation of beneficial enjoyment grants had engendered a “radical departure” 
in the preservation of public beaches was never critically examined.86 Estate villages’ legal closure 
of old rights-of-way and unlawful private encroachment exponentially compounded waterfront 
privatization. After its initial survey of the shore in 1924, the Long Island State Park Commission 
(LISPC) concluded that such lax government oversight and “pre-emption by private owners and 
the closing up of old rights of way” that had provided beach access between estates made the shore 
practically inaccessible.87 In a 1925 speech to the legislature, Democratic Governor Alfred E. 
Smith lamented that the state’s tradition of selling public waterfront had occurred with “apparently 
no thought of the future on the part of [the Land Board] directed towards retaining in the public 
possession for recreation, health and numerous other public purposes.”88 Having abdicated its 
sovereign trust of the foreshore, the state was in danger of squandering a unique public amenity. 
Restrictive village laws designed to exclude the wayfaring public rankled the regional public 
and politicians, outrage that gained support from the powerful State Council of Parks and LISPC, 
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both established by Robert Moses in the 1920s. In June 1925, a riot erupted in the village of 
Huntington when local police barred nonresidents access to the beach.89 In response, Governor 
Smith called a special summer session of the legislature. Broadcast statewide on the radio, Smith 
criticized Gold Coast barons for monopolizing the waterfront. “After you leave the city line . . . 
you can ride in an automobile about fifty miles and you cannot get near the water.” The governor 
went on to condemn local government for parochial isolationism of restricted park and beach 
access.90 Hailing from the Irish slums of Manhattan’s Lower East Side, Smith reportedly told 
Nassau’s landed elites who complained parks would bring “the rabble” to the North Shore, “I am 
the rabble!”91 For nearly a decade, Smith, a well-known urban machine Democrat, was the 
principal figure of New York State’s powerful Progressive Party. Smith implemented widespread 
civil service and social reform in his four terms as state governor between 1918  and 1926. His 
staunch support of urban working-class rights included the right to public recreation.92 New York 
State, Smith declared, would not bend to wealthy residents who deemed the general public 
“undeserving of the superior views” of the North Shore. In concluding “private rights must yield 
to the public demand,” Smith effectively declared war on Gold Coast localism.93 
Estate villages and beneficial enjoyment grants pre-dated state park plans, yet in 1924 North 
Shore privatization became the LISPC’s main target in a fight that revealed this phenomenon to 
the region. The 1924 creation of the LISPC was part of Governor Smith’s sponsorship of public 
recreation and regional planning. Smith declared that “the cure for the evils of democracy is more 
democracy” to which Robert Moses added, “when rich and poor can play side by side at a state-
controlled resort, that theorem is demonstrated.”94 Smith and Moses, the first president of the 
LISPC, claimed that Long Island’s expansive waterfront was a natural playground for New York 
City.95 The LISPC sited parkways along the northern and southern sides of the island as well as 
26 
 
parks and beaches.96 According to the commission, the Northern State Parkway through Wheatley 
Hills would do little damage to local aesthetics or property values, since the right of way 
represented only a fraction of the average estate. Governor Smith rationalized, “the same boulevard 
which carries the millionaire from his office to the threshold of his golf club or estate should carry 
the City man in his small car out to parks and the shorefront in the open country.”97 But Gold Coast 
millionaires valued the North Shore’s uniform inaccessibility. The LISPC’s proposed Northern 
State Parkway through Wheatley Hills, although platted along the southernmost section of the 
Gold Coast, was thus seen as a threat to the entire region. 
Gold Coast barons wielded their influence in both local and county government to fight state 
park planning. Paralleling the way Greens Farms exploited Connecticut’s feeble county 
government, the Nassau County Republican Party, the party of estate owners, rendered the 
potentially powerful county government of New York toothless. In the early twentieth century, 
Boss Wilbur Doughty’s Republican machine took control of Nassau and fostered a decentralized, 
one-party system that let county powers lie fallow while incorporated villages dictated regional 
policies.98 Having depowered county government, in 1924 and 1925 Nassau representatives moved 
to subordinate all state park land acquisitions, and thus all LISPC plans, to approval by the state 
Land Board.99 The LISPC enjoyed complete independence in state government, free from checks 
and balances by any other municipal or state bureau. Of the Land Board’s two appointed 
appraisers, one was brand new, formerly the owner of a paint shop in Buffalo, and neither had 
experience in park planning; the board seemed a likely forum in which Nassau Republicans could 
place individuals willing to block LISPC plans. Governor Smith condemned this attempt to subject 
park planning to local “influence and manipulation” and summarily vetoed the bill.100 Unlike 
Greens Farms, however, Gold Coasters failed to block parks at the state level. 
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When efforts to block the LISPC park plan failed in the legislature, estate owners organized the 
Nassau County Committee (NCC) to co-opt regional planning to support North Shore isolation. 
The committee declared that its 264 members, who owned in aggregate 18,000 acres, spoke for 
regional residents who resented “interference of the state in local affairs” and wished to be “freed 
from the LISPC” that made park and parkway plans “without regard . . . to local needs.”101 In 1925, 
the NCC hired respected landscape architect Charles Downing Lay to complete an independent 
survey of Long Island’s beach and parkway needs. Lay recommended that “the whole territory of 
the northerly part of Nassau County be omitted from any plans for parks or parkways” until the 
district was “ripe” for development—an unspecified and distant future date.102 An impressive 
range of park planners and landscape architects echoed Lay’s call to preserve the Gold Coast and 
offered an alternative to the LISPC’s plan.103 Regional planning and localism were not mutually 
exclusive—regionalism, as Lay’s A Park System for Long Island reveals, could forward local 
community goals.104 Wholly local struggles over public versus private amenities repeated across 
contiguous estate villages and shaped the regional development of the North Shore. Far from 
merely parochial, the state park battle profoundly shaped the estate district’s government and its 
residents’ lifestyles. 
In 1929 the landmark Regional Plan for New York and Its Environs, which on the whole stressed 
the importance of a comprehensive public park network, also omitted regional parks and parkways 
from the North Shore.105 Celebrated Scottish planner Thomas Adams, director of the plan, argued 
that the Gold Coast should be preserved because its lack of development had a public value. 
“Wealthy citizens inclined to use their money in developing and preserving the natural landscape,” 
the Committee on the Regional Plan said, “are creating for the Region . . . something that may be 
as valuable from a cultural point of view as any collection of works of art.”106 Private estates 
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preserved beautiful landscapes at no cost to the public and indirectly contributed, the recreation 
specialist for the plan said, “to the health and enjoyment of all citizens.”107 Adams valued the 
landscape’s uniform beauty but did not acknowledge that its aesthetic could be ideological in and 
of itself—a manifestation of the Gold Coast’s politics of exclusion. He agreed with Lay that North 
Shore parks were unnecessary since the gracious landscaping of far-flung estates veritably 
constituted parkland.108 
Estate village zoning ordinances preserved the North Shore from parks as well as from industry 
and subdivision sprawl. The NCC and Thomas Adams of the Regional Plan codified estate village 
exclusionary laws as good land-use planning. Adams celebrated the estate landscape as “open” 
development that essentially balanced the dense “closed” development of New York’s urbanizing 
outer boroughs.109 This theory of open development grew from and contributed to the planning 
debates of the 1920s and 1930s on the best way to control growth. Cities, leading planners Lewis 
Mumford and Frank Lloyd Wright said, had grown too big, too congested, and too polluted.110 
Estate villages, however, mitigated sprawl. Penetration of closed development into the Gold Coast, 
Adams warned, would constitute nothing less than “a public misfortune.”111 Adams deemed 
valuable estate villages’ restrictive land-use patterns and lack of development intellectually 
defensible. 
While Gold Coasters’ localism appears at first glance contradictory to regional planning goals, 
estate owners easily enlisted regional planners to secure elite estate land-use. Thomas Adams tried 
to convince the LISPC that his assessment of the North Shore was not a challenge to the 
commission’s mission but a legitimate alternative perspective and an important land preservation 
technique.112 Unlike Greens Farms residents, Gold Coasters did not outrightly reject regional 
planning. They did, however, insist that it occur on self-serving terms that flattered their sense of 
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importance. The NCC used regional planning theory to validate their exclusive claim to the 
region’s best environmental amenities and neutralize the authority of planners who advocated 
overriding village priorities through a regional public recreation program.113 The regional plan 
accommodated and ultimately sanctioned elite privacy created by the mutually reinforcing 
decisions of aggregate estate villages. Neither Robert Moses, in his role as park planner, nor 
Governor Smith, with his reputation as a champion of the urban masses, could forgive North Shore 
residents for walling off the shore and leaving the public with only “dust and dirt.”114 To them, 
estate village politics of exclusion could not be excused, even if they did consequently aid the 
overall balance of land use in New York’s hinterlands. No matter the alternative plans presented, 
the LISPC continued to call for North Shore parks and parkways. 
The Limits of the Public Sphere Alongshore 
 
A shared taste for elitist, private recreation and residential patterns became the basis of group and 
social distinction in Greens Farms and on the North Shore in the early twentieth century. Localism 
enabled landed elites to secure such preferences from state-sponsored public recreation. Historians 
who dismiss localism as a multitude of autonomous, small publics unconcerned with any large, 
shared project miss the power of hinterland actors to collectively shape metropolitan growth.115 A 
vernacular regionalism emerged from the choices of North Shore magnates-turned estate village 
leaders. Landowners made calculated decisions that cumulatively fostered a homogeneous private 
leisure landscape.116 Incorporation functioned as a powerful regional development tool, albeit 
rooted in exclusivity rather than the progressive reform traditionally associated with regionalism. 
Gold Coast regionalism preserved its community’s taste for sparse residential development. In 
1930 Nassau’s population density per acre was 12 persons, and the Committee on the Regional 
Plan predicted no substantial change for the coming decade.117 
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Neither the eventual creation of Sherwood Island State Park in Connecticut nor the park and 
parkway plan for Long Island were entirely successful endeavors for their corresponding park 
commissions. The LISPC failed to convince incorporated villages that their attempts “to secure 
isolation from their city and suburban neighbors” would be best served by regional parks to contain 
urban recreationalists.118 After four years of rancorous negotiations, in December 1929 the 
commission acquiesced to a five-mile detour around Wheatley Hills.119 Not only did Gold Coasters 
successfully reroute the parkway south of their estate region, the LISPC was unable to establish a 
single state beach in the region until the 1970s.120 In Connecticut, the legislature refused to 
appropriate to the state park the nearly half a million dollars necessary to complete land 
acquisitions on Sherwood Island until 1937, following the Democrats’ capture of the state 
government during the Depression. The delay forced the state to spend large sums on property 
subdivided expressly to block the park.121 
Albert Turner’s call for Connecticut state responsibility over public beaches remained 
unanswered for thirty years. The National Conference on State Parks (est. 1921), however, 
embraced Turner’s 1914 CSPC report as a foundational text for beach preservation in conjunction 
with California’s 1928 state park survey. In this survey of potential parklands, leading park planner 
Frederick Law Olmsted Jr. demanded the “vigorous safe-guarding” of beaches.122 Today 
California enjoys a reputation for the protection its state law affords public recreation 
alongshore.123 But California’s early beach management parallels that of New York State. After 
achieving statehood in 1850, California authorized the sale of public tidelands and, in 1868, 
established the Board of Tideland Commissioners to facilitate such sales.124 Yet a decade later, the 
state reformed such practices, amending its constitution to forbid the sale of shorelands near 
incorporated municipalities. In 1909 the legislature extended this protection to all tidelands. It was 
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not until the 1930s that California’s Supreme Court prohibited the freeing of tidelands from the 
public trust—until then California, like New York, allowed the privatization of shore deemed 
nonessential to commerce and navigation.125 Finally, in 1938, the state created the California State 
Lands Commission to safeguard public beaches, rejecting exclusionary definitions of community 
beach use, although privatization threats remained.126 Nineteenth-century parallels between New 
York’s and California’s management of public beaches, however, prove ahistorical the popular 
belief of the latter’s beaches as intrinsically public. Twentieth-century parallels can be found 
between California and Connecticut state park commission’s prescient articulation of the public’s 
right to recreate alongshore. Future scholarship on the process by which states championed the 
publicness of beaches has the potential to further illuminate how government management, the 
public trust, and private rights are perennially entwined and contested alongshore. 
In thwarting Progressive-era state beach programs, Greens Farms and the North Shore 
communities valued private privilege over the public good. Park protest in these estate districts 
makes visible the comparative powers of local versus regional governmental units to dictate public 
land use and the extent to which traditions of decentralized government empowered localized 
challenges to regionalism. This story reveals the importance for urban history scholarship to step 
beyond the city to examine metropolitan growth and regional planning from the perspective of 
local players on the periphery. The resulting beach battles led to three important and mutually 
reinforcing lessons. First, park obstruction underscores the exclusionism inherent in these estate 
communities. In Greens Farms, localism meant private consumption of the shore. On the Gold 
Coast, it meant collective consumption by a narrowly defined community. Estate community 
identity depended on keeping the public at large out. Such a vision of the public was particularly 
narrow given the extent to which high property values limited community entry to the wealthy. 
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Estate communities felt no compunction to provide outsiders access and rebuffed CSPC and 
LISPC attempts to do so. Second, the failure of state government to ensure public access to the 
shore in both places reinforced localism. Finally, home-rulers rejected state park planners as 
foreign invaders and endeavored to disable the state’s power to affect regional plans. The lack of 
powerful county-level governance to balance local and metropolitan recreation needs augmented 
the ability of elites to block regional planning. In Greens Farms and on the Gold Coast, Progressive 
state park planners and the recreating public at large represent threats to localism that would not 
be borne. 
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